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The Flexible Mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol provide a robust framework 
for emission reduction issue in a manner that is not just economically efficient, but is also 
pro-growth for trade. In the presence of liquid or illiquid markets, to attain higher value 
from the emission trading, we have shown that coalition strategies provide a pertinent 
alternative to production optimization measures which may not be feasible at times. The 
whole game is analyzed taking a resource based view of the strategic factor markets. We 
have also illustrated the measures needed to provide stability to the coalitions and hence 




With the enactment of the Kyoto Protocol and its implementation, the energy trading map 
is destined to change. The new addition is carbon credits. The success of such 
international climate change agreement would depend on abatement targets and the 
incentives for countries to participate. Equally important would be modus of operandi for 
implementing the emission caps on the businesses as this will bring out the actual 
transformation desired to make a significant reduction in green house gases (GHG).   Trading makes stern targets more economical. Further on appropriate agreements could 
be made to usher in the developing countries by first, allowing them to capture the rents 
from permit sales and then making them a partner in emission reduction. 
The present paper formulates a framework and sketches out how coalitions are formed 
between the businesses or entities to attain set emission targets. A lot of work is being 
done to examine self-enforcing environment agreements using game theoretic concepts, 
whose members are often referred to as coalitions. Our work shares many features with 
these literatures, but differs in important respects. We are not limited to modeling 
international environmental policies as games in emissions. Rather we focus on the 
possibility that the entities agree on a system of emissions trading, as in the Kyoto 
Protocol. The key strategic variable (factor, as we would call them) for members of such 
a trading coalition is the initial endowment with tradable emission rights (or permits).  
Also, it is commonly assumed that coalition members behave cooperatively, maximizing 
their joint payoff. In the case of heterogeneous countries, this involves agreement on a 
particular sharing rule such as the core, Nash equilibrium or Shapley value (e.g. Roth 
1978). On the other hand, countries act selfishly in that they leave (or do not join) a 
cooperating coalition if this increases their payoff. Stability of a coalition depends on the 
prospects to reduce interest conflicts with regards to a minimum agreement. A bargaining 
situation contains opportunities to collaborate for mutual benefits. As demonstrated by a 
real negotiation processes, a full agreement of all players is unlikely. Rather, some 
players may act independently or unilaterally to maximize their own welfare and self-
interests, while other players create small and stable coalitions. The decision to join a 
coalition or initiate a partial coalition depends on the difference in net benefits of a cooperative and a non-cooperative strategy. The combination of both these strategies is 
well elucidated by Brandenburger and Stuart (1995), Lippman and Rumelt, (2003).  
SECTION I 
Kyoto Protocol and Flexible Mechanism 
The Kyoto Protocol was officially launched at the Third Conference of the Parties to the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) held in Kyoto in December 
1997. The aim of this agreement is to reduce the greenhouse gases (GHG). Among the 
main outcomes of this agreement is the commitment by all Annex I (updated list now 
called Annex B)  countries to lower their emissions of six GHG namely, CO2, CH4, N2O, 
HFCs, PFCs and SF6, by at least five percent below the 1990 levels, with a target date 
between 2008 and 2012.  Reduction commitments within the Annex B Group of 
industrialized countries are not uniform. 
Our purpose is not to analyze the Kyoto Protocol, or the Flexible Mechanism
1, but rather 
to suggest various strategies to control GHG emissions as the Kyoto Protocol comes into 
force
2. Traditionally, environmental protection does not list out as a priority for 
businesses. High levels of environmental protection very often go against the interests of 
organizations motivated by profits. They may see this as softening of the competitive 
edge. In wake of these implementation difficulties at the ground level, Kyoto Protocol, 
provides three flexible market oriented mechanisms for reduction of emissions or Kyoto 
Mechanism.  
International Emission Trading (IET): As stipulated in Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, Annex B countries are allowed to transfer/trade their emission allowances, 
                                                 
1 Also called Kyoto Mechanism, it provides for market based approach for implementing the GHG 
emission cap. 
2 Refer Malvik and Westskog (2001) for a discussion on Kyoto Protocol and related policy issues. called "assigned amount units" (AAUs)
3, among themselves. This means that the Annex 
B countries will have the option of buying or selling some portion of their emission 
allowances.  
Joint Implementation (JI): It provides Annex B Parties or their authorized agents to 
transfer marketable emission reduction units (ERUs)
4 tied to a specified project with 
another Annex B country as they participate in cooperative GHG abatement activities. 
Companies or other entities in countries with emission targets can transfer and/or acquire 
ERUs by investing in projects that reduce GHG emissions or impound carbon in other 
countries that have binding commitments.  
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): The CDM is established by Article 12 of the 
Kyoto Protocol. It is a market-based instrument which helps non-Annex B parties to host 
projects that help in cost-effective reductions in GHG emissions as well as contribute to 
their sustainable development goal or economic growth. The Annex B parties can use 
these certified emission reductions to meet part of their commitment. The CDM is meant 
to benefit both industrial and developing countries (Annex B and non-Annex B). The 
CDM provides developing countries with opportunities to become active participants in 
international efforts to curb GHG emissions. 
SECTION II 
Framework for Analyzing the Coalition Strategies 
Here we argue how a coalition can possibly form and why would it sustain. The 
background to analyzing the framework and reasoning the possibility of a gain and 
                                                 
3 The total amount of GHG emissions that each developed country has agreed not to exceed in the first 
commitment period (2008-2012). 
4 A unit of trade representing a specified amount of GHG emissions reductions achieved through a joint 
implementation project. avoiding losses could be done by considering that all the coalition members are trading in 
a strategic factor market. A basic framework for a strategic factor market is given by 
Barney (1986). Simply stating, it is a market where the resources necessary for 
implementing a strategy could be acquired. Hence a market where a coalition or even a 
single player
5 could implement its strategy for abatement of GHG emissions could also 
be called a strategy factor market. The underlying assumption to strategic factor markets 
as given by Barney (1986) is that all strategies that require the acquisition of resources 
for implementation have strategic factor markets associated with them.  An Annex B 
party intending to reduce GHG emission in a low cost fashion, but cannot optimize its 
existing production processes, could do so using the JI mechanism, i.e. tie up with a low 
emission producer to carry on its production or transfer emission credits from this project 
to make up for the requirements for the emission cap. Hence such a producer is looking at 
a strategic factor market where resources
6 to implement its strategies are available from 
other players. 
Further on we take a resource based view in the strategic factor market. Here all tradable 
resources are pooled into the market for trading and no resources are ‘firm specific’. But 
a firm (also a player in the market) can come to the market with a bundle of resources. To 
state it in a more simple term, everything tradable is up for grabs and what needs to be 
resolved is the division of the whole pie, which is the total value of the trade, among all 
the players in the market, associated with the trade.  
                                                 
5 We use players interchangeably with parties who have an emission target to meet or the parties who help 
in reduction of emission targets. They could be from an Annex B country or a non-Annex B country 
depending on the implementation mechanism. Hybrid strategies using various mechanisms are also 
possible. 
6 It could be intellectual property, partnering firm or a carbon sink. These are in line with mechanisms 
suggested in Kyoto Protocol, namely JI, IET and CDM respectively. In neoclassical case, where we can deal with firms as a bundle resources as we are doing 
here, pricing of resources in the market are axiomatized by the assumption of:  
1.  Non co-specialization of resources in the market 
2.  Near perfect price elasticity of demand and supply, or that there are large numbers 
of buyers and sellers for each product or input.  
The market for GHG emission trading, which we are dealing here are to begin with 
nascent. So the second condition for pricing in the neoclassical case is not satisfied. 
Again, with the formation of established markets, and with the setting up of global carbon 
credit
7 exchanges, the liquidity in the market will increase. In such situations, coalition 
formation is feasible (shown in section III and more general in section IV) only when the 
cooperating parties have complementary additions to the resource pool whose combined 
value is higher compared with if the same resource is held or acquired individually.  This 
co-specialization again does not satisfy the first condition for neoclassical pricing 
mechanism. As shown by Roth (1978), Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) answers many 
questions which neoclassical economics cannot. Lippman and Rumelt (2003) write “CGT 
provides a valuable alternative perspective. In particular, CGT separates the issues of 
opportunity cost, value, and the distribution of rents. It replaces the conceptual looseness 
surrounding the economic profit concept with a formal system in which surplus is known, 
but its division is subject to negotiation”. 
 
 
                                                 
7 One carbon credit is equivalent to one ton of CO2 emission. Also other GHG emissions are converted to 
carbon credit using a suitable schedule for easy tradability Analysis of the coalition formation in the strategic factor markets
8 
In a strategic factor market, above normal returns are typically obtained by imperfections 
in the market or by asymmetry of information (also an imperfection). Lets take the case 
otherwise, that is, if both the implementer of a strategy and the controller of the 
resources, have the exactly same and perfectly accurate expectations (obtained from 
symmetric information) about the future value of the product market strategies before the 
trade (or implementation), then the price at which the trade would take place will near the 
expected future value of the resource. This way the gain out of the strategy would be near 
or exactly zero. Hence imperfections or asymmetry of information are essential. In case 
of GHG emission trading, lets us consider the resource to be carbon credits
9. Unless the 
strategizers don’t expect to make an above normal return, which in this case would be 
additional savings in comparison to any other available option or market, or in worse case 
this is the only available market for implementing the strategy, he would not trade in the 
market or more precisely will not join the coalition. 
We now put forward a simple proposition concerning the formation of coalitions which 
also forms the basis of our analysis.  
Proposition 1a: Given no barrier to trade and an open market with perfect competition, 
higher gains can only be attained by forming coalition strategies. 
                                                 
8 The theoretical background to the games we are studying here is given in (Brandenburger and Stuart, 
1995). They provide a complete framework for analyzing games using a noncooperative-cooperative 
model. This helps us understand the scenarios that we come across in strategic factor markets and GHG 
abatement coalitions where we have to solve a dual noncooperative game to understand the cooperative 
stance of the coalitions. 
9 Since the end result is reduction of GHG emissions, we can always convert any trading strategy portfolio 
in terms of its equivalent carbon credit trading strategy. This way calculation of the ex ante value of the 
project could be done in comparison with the expected future values of carbon credits at an established 
carbon credit exchange market, given one exists.  Proposition 1b: Also, for a stable coalition, cooperating parties require sustainable 
complementing factor which makes a positive difference between pre and post coalition 
values of the whole or they are bound by a contract.  
Argument: Lippman and Rumelt (2003) put forward the concept of resource assembly 
and more importantly, strategic equilibrium. Strategic equilibrium is the state in which all 
possible feasible resource transfers that create value have taken place. Going further they 
state that “Absent strategic equilibrium, it is always possible to create additional value by 
a reassignment of resources to tasks” This would mean to come to a state of strategic 
equilibrium, the surplus obtained have to be maximized across all possible assignments 
of all possible resources to all possible tasks. Under the assumption of the presence of a 
perfect market
10 where individual players trade, the strategic equilibrium can be attained 
only if all other feasible scenarios, that is combinations of resources or assignments 
(players) are exploited for maximizing surplus. Hence the only other possible
11 scenario 
is the formation of a coalition.  
The second proposition is very intuitive in the sense that either the coalition partners have 
something to gain from its formation which they might not otherwise, or else they are 
legally or voluntarily bound by a certain agreement which is necessary for the strategy to 
be implemented on the first place. We will elucidate this further when we discuss the 
stability of the coalition strategies in Section IV. 
The purpose of this analysis is to bring out the conditions or the scenarios under which 
the coalitions can possibly form. This way we can strategize in a more efficient manner 
focusing only on those strategies which are feasible and which could be implemented. 
                                                 
10 consider a carbon credit exchange where the liquidity and dept is high 
11 We use ’possible’ because it may happen a coalition may not provide above normal value. Briefly restating the conditions for coalition formation; either there exist no other 
market
12 from where the resources needed for implementing the strategy could be 
acquired, or a higher gain could be obtained by its formation as shown above.  
SECTION III 
 Coalition strategies exemplified 
In order to describe the various possible coalition strategies based on the Kyoto 
Mechanism, we would be using various coalitional structures
13 described by Finus and 
Rundhagen (2003) and stock pollutant model for trans-boundary flow pollution as 
suggested by Germain et al. (1998). On the basis of this model
14 we will explain 
strategies for GHG emission reduction. But we will not go into the details of this model 
or analytically describe it.  
IET based coalition: 
The main basis for this kind of coalitional formation would be that the costs incurred by 
the parties residing in different countries (Annex B), when they undertake measures to 
reduce or control GHG emissions, would vary from one country to another. This way the 
parties where mitigation costs are relatively low can become partners in the coalitions. 
They would undertake a larger share of the efforts required to reach the aggregate 
emissions target for the whole coalition, by way of which the total costs of abatement-
summed across all parties will be lower than if each party controls its emissions in 
isolation. By simply stating this as trading of AAUs
15 would extenuate the possibilities 
                                                 
12 In this sense, we are looking at coalitions as a ‘market forming’ instrument. 
13 Finus and Rundhagen (2003) have essentially described three structures, Open Membership Game 
(OMG), Restricted Open Membership Game (ROMG) and Exclusive Membership Game (EMG). Further 
they have shown that in terms of stability OMG < ROMG < EMG, where < implies less stable.  
14 A similar model is described and simulated by Eychmans and Finus (2003) 
15 The Protocol specifies that AAUs will be denominated in metric tonnes of carbon dioxide with 100-year 
global warming potentials used to calculate the CO2 equivalence of the other five gases covered by the these and other Kyoto Mechanisms brings. It implicitly helps to curb or pause global 
warming, but more so helps in pushing ahead technology transfer and environment 
friendly R&D efforts and pushes ahead global trade in a different approach. The 
coalitions thus formed don’t just have ecological meaning but economic augmentation 
coupled with it. The basis for the initial allocation of AAUs among Annex B Parties is 
each country's target level of emissions. The total number of AAUs is set so that the 
aggregate reduction in emissions equals the target.  
If we analyze this setting as consisting of more than one party which requires either 
lowering abatement cost or additional AAUs and the coalition also consists of more than 
one party which can provide the same, then as proved by Chander and Tulkens (1997), all 
members of the coalition have to decrease their emissions with respect to the non-
cooperative equilibrium
16 level. But in case of a simple two-party coalition game, the end 
result of the negotiations for the sharing of the abatement cost could be brought about 
very simply by calculating its Nash Bargaining Equilibrium. It is possible do so in case of 
multiple player games too, which we discussed earlier, but becomes complicated, esp. as 
the number of players increases. In such a situation, it would be ideal to calculate an 
equilibrium condition for agreement using the dual non cooperative game as we 
suggested and based upon this result come up with the final (possible) figures for the 
division of abatement cost. Hence we put forward fallback non-cooperative equilibrium 
as the baseline condition for the coalition and the coalition strategy for IET to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
agreement. Private entities (e.g., companies, individuals, and non-governmental organizations) might also 
be authorized by their home governments to buy and sell AAUs. The ultimate responsibility for achieving 
the target level of emissions, however, will rest with the national governments 
16 Germain et al (2003) has given an exquisite framework where they have analyzed the whole dynamic 
game of transboundary pollutant flow. Here they have also shown the fallback non-cooperative equilibrium 
condition and further proved the requirements for the parties to cooperate to attain the coalition optimum 
which they term it as international optimum.  implemented with it. On the membership for the coalition, we suggest Exclusive 
Membership as they are ecologically and economically more efficient (Finus and 
Rundhagen, 2003). But then there is a trade off one has to make between the efficiency of 
the coalition and the probability of it forming on the first place. But once formed it can 
ensure stability in the long run. This is not the only condition required for the coalition 
stability though. We have to look at this in terms of the game being played in the strategic 
factor market, which we have done in section IV. There we have outlined the generic 
condition for coalition stability once the strategy is implemented. 
JI based coalition:  
JI mechanism is based on the transfer of ERUs derived from emission reduction projects. 
One of the possible
17 ways in which JI could be brought into play is when parties with 
Intellectual Property on low cost emission reduction technique and parties which have 
capital come together. Also there can be ERUs that are based on sink
18 enhancement 
projects which can act as credits. This can raise the aggregate emissions ceiling of 
participating Parties by an amount that is comparable to the additional amount of carbon 
that is removed as a result of the sink enhancement project. Issues like leakages
19, project 
benefit analysis
20 have to be taken care of in JI.  
In a coalition, if one party owns a patent or has a technique(s) which can reduce the 
emission level at a better cost or to a better level which no one else can at the same cost 
or resources, then its bargaining potential increases in the complete pie. Further the 
                                                 
17 Establishing an accurate baseline is difficult. It is difficult to develop a baseline that compares the 
business-as-usual scenario against the benefits of a given project and the associated available ERUs. 
18 E.g. of sink is a vast forest or natural reserve which the parties agree to create, maintain or expand. 
19Emissions from sources and activities grow outside the boundary of the project. Leakages could offset the 
environmental benefits achieved at the project level. 
20 Failure to accurately account for project benefits or changes in emissions outside the boundary of JI 
projects could result in a situation where the Annex B host country is unable to comply with its emission 
commitments at the end of the compliance period. bargaining stance or power of a party also depends on cost of acquiring the capital which 
another party may have at hand. A thorough treatment of this subject and the possible 
outcomes at the end of negotiation is given by Shapley and Shubik (1969). In regards to 
the membership and stability, refer the IET based coalition. 
CDM based coalitions and other hybrid strategies 
The CDM provides Annex B parties access to emission reduction credits based on GHG 
abatement projects undertaken in a non-Annex B country where the costs of reducing 
emissions might be considerably lower than the costs of comparable reductions at home. 
Here too, as in case of IET and JI, the key issue would be division of the pie. But there is 
one critical difference. Here at least one party does not have an emission target to meet. 
Hence there will be a net financial or intellectual transfer in its favor in all given 
scenarios of the game.  
The hybrid strategy would be a case in which in a single consortium, more than one 
Kyoto mechanisms are implemented. The diversity would esp. arise when the consortium 
opts for a strategy which includes CDM too. This would mean the game or strategy is 
being played across different categories of players (Annex B and Non-Annex B) in 
addition to the cross section of the GHG emission abatement tools opted for. But this 
scenario will be difficult to analyze as a simple case of the strategic factor market game. 
The number of combinations could be immense. One possible way for evaluating such 
strategies would be by taking subsets of coalitions opting for a strategy and solving the 
division problem in each case. But it does not do apt justice as the complete value of the 
coalition will not be realized and hence the solution would prove to be an inefficient
21.  
 
                                                 
21 That means the solution is not the strategic equilibrium and this would result in an unstable coalition. SECTION IV 
Stability of coalitions and related strategies 
Dierickx and Cool (1989) bring out the argument that tradability of a resource can hinder 
the competitive advantage it possessed due to which it was traded on the first place. This 
would mean that as the market grows, the coalitions would have to rethink the strategy or 
the strategic factor which binds them on the first place. But Conner (1991) showed how 
tradability tragedy could be overcome ‘if there are complementarities between the 
resource and the acquirer which are greater than those that would pertain to other 
acquirers’. Lippman and Rumelt (2003) further state that ‘absent complementarities, the 
only gains to trade in the asset market arise from asymmetric information’. This being 
one the base conditions for having above normal returns in a strategic factor market. 
Hence as we had stated earlier in Proposition 1b, the coalitions need this basic binding 
factor
22 for long term stability. Decisions in models like that of GHG abatement coalition 
rely on complementarities and properties of supermodular functions to establish 
monotonicity for optimal decisions. The complementarities hence arising are answered 
by working out the supermodularity of the underlying utility function of the individual 
coalition members. Supermodularity of a function is implicit through the existence of 
equilibrium
23 in the coalition. That implies in absence of equilibrium, there has to be 
some other binding factor like contractual agreement which can decide the division of the 
total value generated. Topkis (1995) has given this very finely by studying the 
comparative statics of coalition models. 
                                                 
22 It could be also be a contract as again stated in the proposition. E.g. of factors could be IPR legally 
protected in that or possibly all markets, restriction imposed by the home govt. making that coalition, the 
only feasible one, etc. 
23 Nash Equilibrium The stability of the coalition further lies in how long it can exploit the imperfection in 
strategic factor with which it has been able to sustain gains. Or how long can it keep 
finding new imperfections
24. To understand this, we have outlined a few imperfections 
which could be exploited in order to prolong the advantage offered by the market and 
sustain the coalition.  
•  Differences in firm expectations are the key to above normal returns from 
acquiring resources from strategic factor markets to implement product market 
strategies. By having an accurate (or near accurate) expectation of the future value 
of the resource, it can play the market in wake of less accurate (i.e. pessimist) 
expectations by other players. 
•  Uniqueness, such that only one firm can implement a strategy, provides a 
competitive advantage (i.e. competitive imperfection exists). 
•  Entry barriers, making it difficult for other players to enter the market on its own 
Conclusion 
The Flexible market mechanisms articulated in the Kyoto Protocol provides a robust 
framework for solving the emission reduction issue in a manner that is not just 
economically efficient, but is also pro-growth for trade. In the presence of liquid or 
illiquid markets, to attain higher value from the emission trading, coalition strategies 
provide a pertinent alternative to production optimization measures which may not be 
feasible at times. We have also outlined the measures needed to provide stability to these 
coalitions and hence the coalition strategies. Since our framework is based on 
Cooperative Game Theory, rather than the neoclassical economics, further work could 
                                                 
24 This would mean that it has to keep modifying its strategies in a manner that it still uses the resources 
available in that particular strategic factor market. also be done by looking at the whole game in the perspective of thick and thin markets, 
wherein we can analyze the coalition with full appropriation and noncomplementarity 
(Makowski and Ostroy 1995). 
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